The Grenfell Report: lessons for architects

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s Phase Two Report, published on 4 September, comprises over 1,700 pages, with a 32-page executive summary, seeking to answer the question: ‘How was it possible in 21st century London for a reinforced concrete building, itself structurally impervious to fire, to be turned into a death trap that would enable fire to sweep through it in an uncontrollable way in a matter of a few hours despite what were thought to be effective regulations designed to prevent just such an event?’

Across its pages, there is stringent criticism for many in local and central government, building regulation, construction and elsewhere. Particularly harsh words, however, are directed at the architecture practice Studio E as ‘bear[ing] a very significant degree of responsibility for the disaster’ with some of its failures having ‘catastrophic consequences’. The report concludes that the practice’s actions, along with those of its fellow participants in the refurbishment, suggest ‘a number of common themes … running through the story which, due to their nature, we think are likely to be repeated widely across the construction industry’. 

In the course of the report, it is made clear that architects bear a significant responsibility for coordinating overall building regulations compliance, and cannot place undue and unchecked reliance on the role of others, such as building control officers, contractors, specialist subcontractors and fire engineers. 

An overarching criticism of Studio E is that it had ‘a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of its obligations’ as lead consultant and designer. These obligations included advising on the need for consultants, specialists, subcontractors and suppliers; coordinating the design of all constructional elements, including work by consultants, specialists and suppliers; and determining materials, elements and components. 

Instead, the practice treated subcontractors and consultants as ‘solely responsible for their work and assumed, without enquiry, that it met the required standards’. In reality, the practice had ‘an overriding obligation … to ensure that the work was carried out properly and the choices of materials were suitable’. 

This reflected a wider failure among contractors to ‘identify their own responsibilities for important aspects of the design’ – each assumed that someone else was responsible for matters affecting fire safety. This was exacerbated by the casual approach to contractual relations pervading the project, with the result that participants did not ‘properly understand the nature and scope of the obligations they had undertaken, or, if they did, paid scant attention to them’. 

It is suggested that this informality may be a widespread culture in construction, and ‘a recipe for disaster if events take an unexpected turn. All those involved in whatever capacity in a complex project need to understand clearly what they have agreed to do and what they are responsible for.’ The report also states that the principal contractor is key in achieving this understanding as ‘the only person who can ensure that clear, documented contractual arrangements are in place before a subcontractor or consultant begins work’.

In this instance, there was a failure to grasp that, under the terms of a belated contract with principal contractor Rydon, the architect remained responsible for the design work it had already carried out, became responsible for any further work it was required to carry out, and had an obligation to take reasonable steps to ensure that all designs, whether produced by itself or any subcontractors, complied with statutory requirements. It also agreed to coordinate design work by contractors, subcontractors, consultants and suppliers, and the steps needed to obtain building control approval. 

Studio E ‘took an unduly narrow view of its responsibilities after the novation’, checking drawings and specifications for ‘architectural intent’ only, and believing contractors and subcontractors were responsible for the design element of their work when in reality, as lead designer, its own responsibilities extended considerably further.

The practice also displayed ‘a fundamental misunderstanding … that the function of building control is to provide a service to applicants rather than to enforce the regulations robustly for the benefit of the community at large’ – it should not be seen as acting as an ‘additional consultant’ or ‘safety net’. 

Despite the practice’s understanding that building control was ‘primarily responsible for confirming compliance’, it was Studio E’s ultimate responsibility to coordinate the design of all constructional elements, including work by consultants, specialists or suppliers, and determine ‘materials, elements and components, standards of workmanship, type of construction and performance in use’, ensuring specified products complied with building regulations. 

Throughout, the report criticises the architect’s lack of familiarity with and understanding of the significance of building regulations, leading to ignorance of how compliance with fire-safety requirements could be achieved, with a tendency to rely on past practice. In addition, there was a failure to refer to guidance around fire performance of materials and cladding systems – including BBA certificates – and to take ‘active responsibility’ for the choice of materials throughout the project, including substitutions by contractors. Alongside the failure to devise a proper cavity-barrier strategy at tender stage, these were ‘serious errors that had direct and catastrophic consequences’. 

Poor record-keeping is strongly criticised, including the failure to ensure that subcontractors’ drawings were complete and accurate, and the endorsement of flawed construction drawings. This resulted in full information, including critical alterations to materials and specifications, not being communicated to building control or the fire-safety consultant. These oversights related to a lack of understanding of responsibilities, but also a general failure to drive forward the completion of the fire-safety strategy – a positive engagement that should be seen as within the remit of a ‘competent architect’ – and also to advise both landlords and contractor that this needed to be achieved. 

There are other criticisms of Studio E along the way, including the inaccuracy of its final ‘as-built’ drawings; the inadequate internal peer-review processes and quality assurance systems at the practice, with an over-reliance on continuing professional development (CPD); as well as a general lack of familiarity with industry guidance. 

Two specific recommendations to architects are made at the close of the report. The first urges the Architects Registration Board (ARB) and the RIBA to review changes already made to improve the education and training of architects since the tragedy. 

At the RIBA, these changes have included creating a library of health and life safety CPD, introducing a health and safety test (to become mandatory in 2025) with a companion guide from RIBA Publishing, and launching a Principal Designer Register – all of which are annually reviewed. 

The ARB, meanwhile, has introduced a mandatory scheme for CPD, applying to all registered architects, and new competency outcomes that all providers of ARB-accredited qualifications must meet.

The report’s second recommendation to architects is for a statutory requirement that an application for building control approval in relation to the construction or refurbishment of a higher-risk building (Gateway 2) be supported by a statement from a senior manager of the principal designer under the Building Safety Act 2022. This would state that all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that, on completion, the building as designed will be as safe as is required by the building regulations. 

Among the many wider recommendations are proposals that the government ‘draw together under a single regulator all the functions relating to the construction industry to which we have referred’, and that ‘to define a building as “higher risk” by reference only to its height is unsatisfactory’. 

But the report’s fundamental message is that safety must always remain the absolute priority, irrespective of participants’ assumptions about areas of responsibility. As Thouria Istephan, a panel member on the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, and previously a partner at Foster + Partners, said at the launch of the report: ‘If you work in the construction industry and you don’t feel the weight of responsibility you have to keep people safe, you are in the wrong job.’